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6.2 Small Businesses Need Strong Mediators: Mitigating the Disadvantages of 
Peripheral Localisation through Alliance Formation 
 
Abstract  
This paper investigates how small entrepreneurial firms in two peripheral regions 
developed by entering the oil and gas industry. The paper draws on previous studies 
related to the establishment of strategic alliances and emerging clusters and 
contributes to these research streams by examining the disadvantages of peripheral 
localization and small firm size. We use a longitudinal case study based on primary 
data consisting of 54 in-depth interviews conducted between 2007 and 2012 to 
illustrate that when large-scale oil and gas projects enter a peripheral region, oil 
companies can moderate local firms’ disadvantages related to peripheral localization 
by actively facilitating relationships with established national firms. By facilitating 
such relationships and maintaining an active moderating role, strategic alliances and 
emerging cluster structures can arise. A cross-case analysis illustrates that the oil 
company had a decisive role in one of the two cases in two dimensions: its role as 
intermediary between local firms and national firms and its role in fostering the 
development of an emerging cluster structure by stimulating the establishment of 
new firms through the oil and gas project. In the second case, the oil company was 
unable to facilitate regional development. 
 
Introduction 
Numerous studies have investigated the issues related to firms operating in industry 
clusters (Porter, 2003; Dahl & Pedersen, 2004). Their results strongly suggest that 
clusters facilitate firm competitiveness and performance (e.g. Lechner & Leyronas, 
2012). Leading industries are often located in areas where large concentrations of 
businesses operate in close proximity to each other, thus demonstrating the 
propensity of firms in clusters to perform better than the average, solitary firm.  
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Within the literature on firm performance and development in relation to geography, 
few studies have focused on issues related to firms operating outside core industrial 
regions (Anderson, 2000; Virkkala, 2007). What about firms operating outside 
industry clusters? How can they exploit upcoming business opportunities? This study 
investigates how the entry of large-scale oil and gas projects affects regional industry 
by facilitating interfirm collaboration, which, in turn, can foster emerging cluster 
structures. We focus on two newly formed strategic alliances and their processes of 
actively attempting to establish networks with actors in national industry clusters. 
The following research questions guide the empirical investigation: (1) In what way 
can large oil and gas companies facilitate the formation of regional networks and 
strategic alliances? (2) How can large-scale oil and gas projects and strategic alliances 
foster regional cluster formation?  
 
In the sections that follow, we discuss the concept of clusters and how they emerge. 
In addition, we present a theoretical discussion of networks and strategic alliances, 
and we elaborate on the features of peripheral regions. Furthermore, we present our 
methodology, research contexts and cases. Next, we present our findings and a cross-
case analysis of those findings. Finally, we present the study’s conclusions and 
implications before closing with a discussion on the limitations of the research and 
suggestions for further research. 
 
Conceptual Background 
Cluster Dynamics 
Concentrations of businesses fascinate scholars, and a number of terms describing 
the phenomenon has emerged, such as clusters (Porter, 1990), and agglomerations 
(Ellison & Glaeser, 1999). The different ways of viewing concentrations of businesses 
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have led to definitional issues, particularly in terms of industrial and geographical 
boundaries (see Martin & Sunley, 2003, for a definitional review of clusters).  
 
After reviewing the literature on geographical concentrations of businesses and their 
definitions, the cluster concept was deemed the most appropriate. Industrial clusters 
can be defined as, “ ... a group of establishments located within close geographic 
proximity of one another, which either share a common set of input needs, or rely on 
each other as supplier or customer” (Gibbs & Bernat, 2001, p. 19).  
 
Clusters create a competitive advantage both for the collective and individual firms 
(Tallman et al., 2004). As a result of both direct cluster effects and network processes, 
firms in clusters have enhanced access to information and resources compared with 
those situated outside the cluster (Schmitz, 1999; Tallman et al., 2004). Access to 
knowledge is central to discussions of cluster effects (Basant, 2002). Clustered firms 
have better access to knowledge than do remote firms because information is “sticky” 
and location specific (Bell, 2005). The degree to which firms can benefit from a 
cluster’s common knowledge base—and thus facilitate development—is premised on 
 
 
Figure 1. Landscapes of regional cluster configurations. 
Source: Romanelli and Khessina (2005, p. 350). 
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firm performance. Additionally, the size and role of firms within clusters vary, 
influencing the ways in which clusters function (Lechner & Leyronas, 2012). 
 
Romanelli and Khessina (2005) developed a model illustrating four distinct types of 
regional cluster configurations. Figure 1 shows that the Type 1 configuration is 
characterized by a situation in which one dominant cluster operates independently 
and is unrelated to other regional clusters. The Type 2 configuration represents a 
region in which the operations of one dominant cluster are related to other smaller 
clusters, such as in Silicon Valley. Several nondominating clusters that share no 
connection represent the Type 3 configuration, which Romanelli and Khessina 
deemed to be the most common. Finally, the Type 4 configuration consists of several 
nondominating clusters that are interrelated (Romanelli & Khessina, 2005). In the 
cross-case analysis, we further elaborate these four different modes of regional 
clustering. We also emphasize the important role of moderators by illustrating how 
moderators facilitate and affect the dynamic process of clustering in peripheral 
regions. 
Cluster Emergence 
The phenomenon of cluster emergence remains theoretically and empirically 
underexplored. The early work of Marshall suggested that clustering occurs because 
firms realize benefits related to reduced transport costs, whether they are associated 
with people, goods, and/or ideas (Marshall, 1920). These assumptions have been 
somewhat criticized for being too general because they do not consider the possibility 
that firms are heterogeneous (Ellison et al., 2010). 
 
Because firms have different levels of resource bases, capabilities, human capital and 
so forth, firms will also have different sets of strategies and abilities to develop. Shaver 
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and Flyer (2000) showed that firms’ different levels of maturity and dynamism affect 
their motivation to geographically cluster. Although weak firms have little to lose and 
much to gain by clustering, strong dominating firms can actually suffer from clustering 
because of the potential loss of exclusive possessions (e.g. technologies, employers, 
suppliers). Thus, heterogeneity can play a role in firms’ choice of location. 
 
Extending this view is the importance of so-called focal firms in clusters. Focal firms 
are superior actors that often orchestrate and engage in a disproportionate part of a 
cluster’s activity and that have the ability to either intentionally or unintentionally 
transfer information and technology to smaller, related firms (Lazerson & Lorenzoni, 
1999). For example, focal firms can facilitate new market opportunities and thereby 
spur start-ups, function as role models for other firms and take on the role as agents 
of change (Boari, 2001). The potential effects that focal firms can facilitate highlight 
the importance of such actors in stimulating both the creation of clusters and the 
development of existing ones. 
 
To adapt to changing environments and exploit synergies between firms, some 
heterogeneity must exist (Menzel & Fornahl, 2010). Some scholars have argued that 
cluster homogeneity, including the absence of external actors, provides the highest 
value for firms. Because of their similar sets of cultural and historical backgrounds, 
local communities will, in a way, stick together and share collective goods across 
organizational borders (Lazerson & Lorenzoni, 1999). However, the potential risks of 
such introvert milieus are that their firms’ exposure to new ideas declines, their ability 
to learn new skills weakens and their ability to invent new technologies is eliminated 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
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Evolutionary economic geography scholars have studied spatial clustering but have 
reported contradictory results. Håkanson (2005), for example, stated that 
globalization can spur clustering in three ways. First, increased volume of demand 
from a single location can increase the scope of specialization and division of labour. 
Second, globalization may increase the volume and importance of foreign direct 
investments. Finally, globalization may facilitate the immigration of individuals with 
skilled expertise. All these issues may be of particular importance in peripheral regions 
that lack the competences and capabilities necessary to react to changes in the 
market. 
 
Several longitudinal case studies have provided in-depth accounts of actual cluster 
formations. Some scholars have claimed that clusters emerge as an evolutionary 
process owing to firm spinoff formations (Kenney & Patton, 2006; Dahl et al., 2010). 
In addition, scholars have found support for the proposition that cooperation 
between firms, suppliers and universities plays a significant role in emerging clusters 
(Brenner, 2005; Scott, 2005). 
 
The establishment of linkages to external knowledge providers can facilitate cluster 
emergence. The ability of entrepreneurs to first establish such linkages and then 
maintain knowledge flow might gradually facilitate regional cluster structures (Henn, 
2013). Thus, external knowledge is important for cluster formation and can be 
assumed to be particularly important in peripheral regions.  
 
The phenomenon of cluster emergence is unclear, and no definitional or conceptual 
consensus on cluster emergence exists. This section of the paper illustrates that 
complexity and shows that clusters emerge from idiosyncratic conditions. 
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Peripheral Regions, Networks and Strategic Alliances 
The concept of peripheral localization is often associated with negative descriptions 
based on distance from a core (Anderson, 2000). Small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in peripheral regions face additional challenges to their competitiveness 
beyond the innate limitations associated with organizational size (Cooke, 1996; 
Vossen, 1998). For example, firms may suffer from low levels of research and 
development and innovation because of the dominance of SMEs in traditional 
industries, the absence of specialized clusters, and the lack of connections to 
knowledge providers and support institutions (Tödtling & Trippl, 2005). 
 
Barriers related to remoteness can be mitigated by establishing networks, which 
increase access to knowledge and scarce resources (Gulati, 1998). Previous studies 
illustrate that knowledge networks positively affect innovative performance 
(Casanueva et al., 2013). There are two forms of knowledge networks: (1) contact 
networks and (2) alliance networks. Contact networks are dynamic relationships in 
which nonformalized interaction flows between firms and other actors, whereas 
alliance networks are usually based on formalized types of collaboration, such as joint 
ventures and strategic alliances (Huggins & Johnston, 2010). In terms of improving 
firm performance, managers tend to focus mostly on establishing formal relationships 
(Doz & Hamel, 1998). 
 
The concept of structural holes (Burt, 1982) has often been linked to network studies. 
The concept addresses the absence of ties among actors (Burt, 1992). A recent study 
has found a positive relationship between firm performance and regional networks 
rich in structural holes (Lechner & Leyronas, 2012). In other words, if one firm is able 
to establish a relationship with several firms that are not connected to one another, 
firm performance will improve. 
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A strategic alliance is a cooperative arrangement between two or more firms with the 
goal of improving performance and competitiveness by sharing resources (Ireland et 
al., 2002, p. 413). The reasons why strategic alliances are formed can often be 
explained in relation to a firm’s surroundings (Gulati, 1998). If a firm is able to conduct 
its business independent of changes in its environment, partnerships are less 
important. By contrast, a firm may face challenges represented by factors such as 
resource deficiencies when its surroundings are changing (Park et al., 2002). 
 
Previous studies have demonstrated that in alliances consisting of small and large 
firms, small firms can benefit from access to resources, skills and legitimacy (Alvarez 
& Barney, 2001; Yang et al., 2013). Linking these benefits to the disadvantages of 
being in peripheral regions, an assumption can be made that small firms in peripheral 
regions may struggle to benefit from alliances because of a lack of alliance capabilities. 
 
The previous sections of this paper discuss the concepts of industry clusters, networks 
and strategic alliances in relation to the contextual issue of peripheral regions. 
Because smaller firms have been shown to obtain the greatest benefits by establishing 
alliances with larger firms, a relation can be drawn to the Types 1 and 2 cluster 
configurations in Figure 1. In this way, the view on strategic alliances coincides with 
the view of cluster configurations in this study. The Types 3 and 4 cluster 
configurations, on the other hand, are characterized by the absence of a large 
dominant actor. By building on the notion that the greatest benefits can be obtained 
by unifying small firms with large firms, the Types 3 and 4 cluster configurations can 
be assumed to generate fewer benefits. In addition, in peripheral regions that are 
characterized as weak and resource deficient, the same reasoning can be assumed to 
apply when related to the role of large firms in cluster emergence. 
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Methods 
Research Contexts 
The first region is characterized as a traditional coastal community, where the local 
industry is composed of fisheries and basic mechanical industries. In addition, an oil 
and gas supply base that serves basic offshore activities has been located there since 
the 1980s. In the early 2000s, a major oil company decided to develop an oil and gas 
field off the coast of the municipality and that its offshore activities would be served 
from a supply base within the municipality. This decision resulted in a vast 
mobilization led by local politicians and local businesses. Between 2007 and 
September 2012, the region experienced an immense industrial development, 
resulting in the investment of more than 125 million Euros. In addition, several 
national and international firms have established themselves in the municipality to be 
located closer to the offshore activities. 
 
The second region has similar characteristics to the first region, but it has hosted an 
oil field operations centre since the mid-1990s. Thus far, little activity has been 
created outside the operations centre even though the oil company has organized 
 
 
Figure 2. Supply industry clusters in Norway. 
Source: Henriksen (2010, p. 370). 
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several development projects for local businesses from that location. Figure 2 
illustrates the size and strength of the national oil and gas supply industry clusters. 
The supply industry situated in northern Norway is currently showing signs of moving 
from a state of dispersion with many peripheral firms to one that is more central. 
Projects Alpha and Beta have contributed to this movement.  
 
The notion of peripheral localization primarily describes the geographical distance to 
a central location (Figure 2). In this study, however, both regions are also suffering 
greatly from the absence of strong actors that have national and international 
relationships. In many ways, the two regions provide symptomatic displays of similar 
small and peripheral regions in Norway that are characterized by stagnation and 
inertia. 
 
Research Design and Data Collection 
A longitudinal case study approach was deemed appropriate. We collected data in the 
period between 2007 and 2012, focusing on local industrial development related to 
the introduction of large-scale petroleum projects.  
 
The primary data consist of 54 formal interviews with key informants related to two 
large-scale projects. We collected primary data from three categories of actors to 
obtain a compound data material consisting of business representatives, public  
Table 1. Overview of informants 
Year Business representatives Public officials Sector experts Total 
2007 7 4 4 15 
2008 6 3 2 11 
2009 6 3 1 10 
2010 7 0 0 7 
2011 4 1 0 5 
2012 3 2 1 6 
Total 33 13 8 54 
145  
  
  
officials and sector experts. Formal interviews lasted, on average, about one hour. 
Table 1 presents an overview of the informants. 
 
Data Analysis 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using the Nvivo coding 
software. In the coding process, we followed the basic rule for the constant 
comparative method suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967). After completing the 
two steps of the coding process, the data consisted of four core categories: 
(1) Role of moderator1 
(2) Structure and formality of alliances 
(3) Disadvantages of peripheral localization and small firm size 
(4) Conditions for firm development and cluster formation 
We asked the informants whether they agreed with the interpretation and 
representation, and this data triangulation improved the quality of the study (Patton, 
2002). Discussing our findings with fellow researchers and informants also increased 
the credibility of our observations. We claim that the two cases might facilitate 
learning that can be transferable to similar cases. 
Case Presentation 
Two units are analysed in this study, strategic alliance A (SAA) and strategic alliance B 
(SAB). Table 2 presents the case properties. 
 
Strategic Alliance A 
SAA was established in 2008, when eight regional firms recognized the possibility of 
increasing their efforts in the regional oil and gas industry. Today, SAA consists of 
seven individually owned firms, each with a similar equity share in the business unit. 
Combined, the seven firms employ more than 500 people and exceed 38 million Euros 
in turnover (2012).  
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Table 2. Case properties 
 SAA SAB 
Number of firms 7 (8) 11 
Industry composition/ 
services provided 
Welding, plumbing, mechanical 
fabrication, engineering, materials 
testing, etc. 
Engineering, hydraulics, electrical 
engineering, technical support 
and provision, etc. 
Employees 500 520 
Turnover (Euros) 38 million 57 million 
Characteristics Mainly traditional production/ 
service provider 
More technically oriented 
Formality of 
cooperation 
High Low 
Level of heterogeneity Medium High 
 
SAA managed to enter into a strategic partnership with main contractor A (MCA), 
thereby mitigating the disadvantages of small size and remoteness to central markets 
and decision-makers. After the establishment of SAA, one of the first objectives was 
to acquire a much-needed source for legitimacy and visibility. Legitimacy was 
achieved first by qualifying for the Achilles® joint qualification system, a system that 
identifies, qualifies, evaluates and monitors suppliers and sub-suppliers. A further 
measure for attaining legitimacy in the oil and gas industry was to qualify for an ISO 
9001 qualification. The overall objective of SAA is to serve maintenance and 
modification markets related to petroleum activities in the Norwegian Sea. 
 
Strategic Alliance B 
The formation of SAB involved a different approach. In 2009, main contractor B (MCB) 
entered into a collaborative agreement with a regional firm in northern Norway. In 
order for the regional firm to be able to serve a potential contract, an agreement was 
made to engage a newly formed firm network consisting of 10 regional firms. This 
agreement soon led to the establishment of SAB between the individual regional firm 
and the firm network. SAB represented 11 firms with a combined employment of 520 
and a total turnover exceeding 57 million Euros (2012). 
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As opposed to SAA, SAB already had its liabilities covered in the form of a binding 
agreement with MCB. However, SAB differed from SAA in that the individual firm had 
a somewhat dominant role in relation to the original firm network. As with SAA, the 
semidominant firm made several strategic investments, including the ISO 9001 
qualification and Achilles® registration. The role of the original firm network was to 
function merely as a supplier to the semidominant firm. This split liability eventually 
resulted in the separation of the alliance, and the two units returned to their 
traditional states. At the conclusion of this study, only the semidominant firm had a 
role in project Beta. 
 
Empirical Findings 
Project Alpha 
In Figure 3, Square 1.1 portrays the initial situation before SAA was established. Oil 
company α clearly signalled that it emphasized the development of regional suppliers. 
“From day one, we have focused on contributing to local development based on 
commercial criteria”, one representative stated. To facilitate this development, one 
of the company’s first tasks was to communicate that for regional firms to be 
perceived as potential suppliers, they first had to join forces. This need arose from the 
regional firms’ small size and lack of capacity. 
 
SAA representatives and sector experts highlighted the important role of the oil 
company in emphasizing cooperation among regional firms. In particular, the oil 
company’s plenary seminars were mentioned as both a valuable arena for networking 
and a conduit for information exchange. The seminars led to initial discussions about 
cooperation among people working in the regional firms. When α finished conducting 
this first stage of mapping potential regional suppliers, a number of firms were 
deemed appropriate. The second stage of approaching regional firms was to conduct 
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meetings with each individual firm (Square 1.2). A state of semirelated connectedness 
among A1, A2... A8, and α was thus constructed. 
 
Sometime after α had approached each separate firm, SAA was established (Square 
1.3). SAA first established a common understanding and agreement of how this 
interfirm unit was to be organized. A SAA representative explained that the alliance 
was based on highly formalized premises that were fully agreed upon among all 
alliance members. The degree of formality assured the interests of all the firms and 
had a mitigating effect on their innately competitive nature.  
 
One apparent problem remained: SAA lacked the legitimacy and trustworthiness 
necessary to be perceived as a potential supplier. SAA faced a paradox: to become a 
supplier in the oil and gas industry, a company should possess a list of achievements, 
but none of the SAA members did so.  
 
The last stage in our model incorporates the entry of MCA. During the formation and 
establishment of SAA, MCA was awarded the main contract for the maintenance and 
modification services in project Alpha. The next move for α was to actively facilitate 
an arena for MCA and SAA to communicate and share ideas. This move resulted in 
two outcomes. First, α awarded a maintenance contract to SAA. Second, SAA and 
MCA established a formalized relationship in which MCA was to function as a safety 
switch for SAA’s fulfilment of the contract. At the same time, α actively monitored 
this process (Square 1.4). 
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Figure 3. The effect of moderator on alliance and cluster formation (adapted from 
Romanelli & Khessina, 2005). 
 
 
Project Beta 
In Figure 4, Square 2.1 illustrates the initial situation prior to the establishment of SAB. 
Here, the individual firm had semidominance over an established local firm network, 
and the individual firm and the firm network competed for the same regional 
customers. In Square 2.2, SAB was formed as a semirelated alliance. At that time, MCB 
had been awarded a maintenance and modification contract from oil company β, 
which included the involvement of SAB. The alliance was established because the 
semidominant firm depended on additional capacity to carry out its 50% share of the 
contract with MCB. Thus, the basis of the SAB alliance was of a different nature than 
the collectively established SAA. In addition, SAB was formed with no influence from 
β.  
 
β and MCB communicated only with the semidominant firm. At the same time, an 
independent variable was introduced in the form of a corporate development 
programme (CDP) aimed at developing and qualifying northern Norwegian suppliers. 
The information then flowed from β to SAB through the CDP, while the semidominant 
firm fed information from β and MCB to the alliance partners. At this stage of  
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Figure 4. The failure of moderating alliance and cluster formation (adapted from 
Romanelli & Khessina, 2005). 
 
development, SAB started to show signs of deterioration, and interaction between 
the original firm network and the semidominant firm weakened. Eventually, this lack 
of communication led to the separation of SAB, which resulted in the semidominant 
firm operating independently of the original firm network (Square 2.3). Following the 
separation, the firm network’s only relation to Beta was its mediated communication 
with β through the CDP. Square 2.4 illustrates the end situation, in which the 
remaining actors in project Beta were β, MCB and the semidominant firm. 
 
Cross-Case Analysis 
Role of Moderator 
Initially, projects Alpha and Beta shared various similarities. However, as the empirical 
findings illustrate, each project’s sequence of events resulted in a different outcome. 
For the regional firms in project Alpha, the path into the oil and gas industry was 
initiated with the establishment of an alliance network, which can be observed as a 
formal mode of cooperation (Huggins & Johnston, 2010). A representative from SAA 
explained the reasons for establishing an alliance network:  
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“The alliance was established as a direct consequence of the oil company’s interest in 
having us do so. Individually, each company in the alliance simply represented too 
much of a risk for α to consider us to be a potential supplier.” 
Thus, the role of oil companies α and β was central to the projects’ outcome. Figure 
3 illustrates, first, how α facilitated the formation of SAA through direct interaction 
with each individual firm and, second, how α moderated the interrelation between 
MCA and SAA. Figure 4 shows that oil company β chose a different approach. Its role 
as moderator was effectively delegated to MCB, the semidominant firm and the CDP. 
Both α and MCA established field offices to overcome the vast geographic distance to 
the new suppliers. An SAA informant highlighted the opportunity for daily 
communication with the contractor as a crucial success factor:  
“I believe the localising of key project functions in the region, and purchasing and 
recruitment in particular, represents the key to success. This mitigates the cruel 
disadvantages related to lack of proximity.” 
Table 3 further illustrates the oil companies’ different approaches towards regional 
firms in projects Alpha and Beta. 
Table 3. Quotes illustrating the role of moderator 
 Alpha Beta 
Role of 
moderator 
“α has been exemplary in terms of 
feeding the regional suppliers with 
information about the industry, but even 
more importantly; they have connected 
regional suppliers to national and 
international actors. This way, regional 
suppliers have had the opportunity to 
display their skills and capabilities” 
(sector expert) 
“We soon established a quality 
assurance system, and they (MCB) 
visited us three times for revisions. This 
illustrates that in fact we were facing 
the same strict requirements set by β” 
(semidominant firm representative) 
 “We bring in our skills and expertise in 
cases where firms lack specific assets. 
This way, local firms can increase 
their sets of competences” (α 
representative) 
“The way that β has approached the 
region is pretty much the exact opposite 
of what α has done in the Alpha project. 
α has displayed a true will to challenge 
the traditional way of approaching local 
communities” (sector expert) 
152  
  
  
 “α functioned as a door-opener for 
them (SAA), and now they have been 
awarded a contract. This is both 
exemplary by α, and necessary for 
regional suppliers trying to develop” 
(sector expert) 
“They (β) have been here for quite some 
time now, but really, nothing has 
happened” (public official) 
“α has chosen to organize the contract 
structure so that smaller firms can take 
part. β, on the other hand, has a 
business-as-usual-approach to their 
project. The size and complexity of 
contracts are simply unattainable. 
Basically their contract structure 
excludes close to all firms in our region” 
(SAB representative) 
 
 
Structure and Formality of Alliances 
In SAA, the formality of cooperation was premised mainly on the individual firms’ 
equal equity share in the alliance. The level of formality in the cooperative 
arrangement led to a mutual interest in fostering a collective good for the alliance. 
This collective good, in turn, proved to minimize potential conflicts arising out of 
different strategies and levels of influence related to the SAA activities. The 
composition of SAA’s actors can be argued to represent an appropriate level of 
heterogeneity in terms of both services/goods provided and firm size (Menzel & 
Fornahl, 2010).  
 
The regional firms in SAB based their mode of cooperation on less formalized 
agreements. The nature of this type of network is more closely related to random 
interaction (Huggins & Johnston, 2010). An informant from the firm network 
explained the allocation of responsibilities between the actors in SAB: “They (the 
semidominant firm) do all of the formal coordination (with MCA), while our role is to 
do what we are asked to do.” This dimension of interaction and informal relationship 
led to the collapse of SAB. This result can be analysed in relation to the findings of 
Lechner and Leyronas (2012) indicating that firm performance is positively associated 
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with firms’ connectedness in a regional network, and to the findings of Johannisson 
(2000) indicating that firms with more partners have better firm performance.  
 
The semidominant firm, which successfully survived the processes of separating from 
SAB and intensifying relationships with both MCB and b, had performance attributes 
surpassing those of the firm network and held a higher rank in the Beta value chain. 
Thus, the level of heterogeneity in SAB may have been too high, as Menzel and 
Fornahl (2010) found in their study.  
 
Empirical studies have shown that a positive relation exists between structural holes 
and firm performance (Lechner & Leyronas, 2012). The semidominant firm obtained 
a network rich in structural holes. Square 2.2 in Figure 4 illustrates a situation in which  
 
Table 4. Quotes illustrating the structure and formality of alliances 
 Alpha Beta 
Structure and 
formality of 
alliances 
“One of the first things we did was to 
establish a set of common principles. 
The main principle is that all major 
decisions will be made based on 
majority verdicts” (SAA 
representative) 
“Our main goal is to develop our oil 
and gas related competences through 
this contract, and thereby be able to 
take on future contracts. Part of this 
competence leveraging will be 
developed by drawing on the skills of 
our alliance partners” (semidominant 
firm representative) 
 “All alliance partners get access to 
three main aspects through this 
contract; access to new markets, firm 
development, and exclusivity due to 
the status of our partner 
(MCA)” (SAA representative) 
“I have no belief in business vice 
cooperation based on nonformalised 
agreements. All eight firms have paid 
the same amount of money into the 
unit (SAA). I believe this is the only 
way to secure cooperation based on 
commercial criteria where all 
partners’ interests are retained” (SAA 
representative) 
“We wanted direct contact with them 
(β) because of two reasons: 1; the 
ability to develop our competences 
through direct and continuous 
interaction with the oil company, and 
2; the opportunity to yield more 
profit. As a sub supplier the margins 
are awfully low because of the high 
number of competitors” (firm network 
representative) 
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the semidominant firm benefits from information flows from both dominant parties 
in the relationship (β and MCB) and from the firm network. This relationship marks 
what Burt (1992) has called the basis of competition, namely, the process of securing 
productive relationships (Table 4). 
 
Disadvantages of Peripheral Localization and Small Firm Size 
Previous studies have suggested that SMEs in peripheral regions face additional 
challenges to competitiveness beyond organizational size (Cooke, 1996; Vossen, 
1998), and such additional challenges were observed for the regional firms in this 
study. The regions in which the firms were located have traditionally suffered owing 
to their vast distance from both markets and decision-makers. However, the different 
characteristics often associated with peripheral regions were somewhat challenged 
in this study. A representative from oil company β recalled that regional firms 
possessed novel expertise: 
“We have visited quite a few firms up there, and what we see is that, surprisingly, 
many of them possess valuable knowledge and expertise. In my opinion, much of what 
we are looking for actually exists close to the field activities.” 
 
 
Figure 5. The mitigating effect of cluster formation on level of periphery. 
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This statement clearly illustrates some of the many issues that northern Norwegian 
firms face. Because of their lack of proximity to strong clusters, large firms such as 
MCA and MCB have never been forced to look for suppliers outside their own 
contexts. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the shift in how the regional firms in SAA moved from a state of 
fragmentation to a state of an emerging cluster. A fundamental change has taken 
place since the development of the oil and gas industry in the Alpha region during the 
mid-2000s. Firms’ remoteness to core actors in Norwegian clusters has been 
mitigated through a combination of three major factors. First, northbound offshore 
activities have forced established cluster participants to consider remote partnerships 
and branch establishments. Second, an increased recognition of northern Norwegian 
suppliers has occurred because of firms’ different levels of upgrading and positioning. 
Third, national policy pressure aimed at both oil companies and main contractors to 
contribute to regional development has increased. 
 
Table 5. Quotes illustrating the disadvantages of peripheral localization and small 
firm size 
 Alpha Beta 
Disadvantages of 
peripheral localization 
and small firm size 
“One of the key challenges is to 
have the opportunity to show 
what we are capable of. We have 
most certifications and we have 
excellent references from related 
industries, but still it’s a long way 
to actually deliver products or 
services to oil companies or main 
contractors” (SAA representative) 
 
“Northern Norwegian firms lack 
three critical components; 
networks to relevant actors, 
relevant competences and 
capabilities, and financial capital” 
(semidominant firm 
representative) 
 “Some refer to us as a well hidden 
gem” (SAA representative) 
“We spend millions annually on 
networking and taking part in 
relevant arenas. This is extremely 
cost demanding in the process we 
are in (entering the oil and gas 
market), so hopefully it will pay off 
in the future” (semidominant firm 
representative) 
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 “If main contractors to oil 
companies could choose for 
themselves, I’m certain they would 
ignore the hassle of looking towards 
Northern Norwegian for potential 
suppliers” (SAA representative) 
“Entering the oil and gas industry 
is no easy task. It seems to me like 
either you have to know 
‘somebody’, or you have to more 
or less pay a contractor in order to 
take a shot” (SAB representative) 
 
“After a while we saw the cynical 
sides of the industry. For example, 
when the contract is signed you 
have to constantly make sure you 
get your piece of the pie. This was 
not what we expected, but I guess 
it is just a part of the game. Large 
firms have their ways of 
cooperating with smaller partners. 
We realised that we had been 
naive” (SAB representative) 
 
The combination of these three factors applies to both project Alpha and project Beta. 
However, the developments that started taking place during the mid-2000s were 
most prominent in the Alpha region during the period of this study. The major 
decision to select an onshore supply base location was made in 2009. This decision 
spurred extensive investment activity by both municipality administrations and 
private investors. By 2013, nearly 140 million Euros have been invested in 
infrastructure, and more than 20 firms have been established in the region (Table 5). 
Conditions for Firm Development and Cluster Formation 
An emerging cluster structure was observed in the Alpha region because of two main 
events. First, the regional firms were able to form a strategic alliance with a large 
national firm while maintaining a close relationship with oil company α. Regional 
municipalities also played an important role in making heavy investments in 
infrastructure for the new industry. This infrastructure, in turn, attracted private 
capital investments and resulted in the establishment of additional firms in the region 
(Håkanson, 2005). By December 2012, the Alpha region hosted a growing cluster. This 
development is very similar to the cluster formation process and place-specific 
conditions that have been proposed by Feldman and Francis (2004).  
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One observed cluster effect was the increased availability of resources and flow of 
external information benefiting firms in the Alpha region (Tallman et al., 2004; Henn, 
2013). Additionally, the competitiveness of firms in the Alpha region has drastically 
increased, mainly because of their increased legitimacy in the national oil and gas 
industry. Oil company α had a central role in stimulating the emerging cluster. The 
ability to cause change and facilitate new market opportunities among regional firms 
is consistent with existing knowledge about focal firms (Lazerson & Lorenzoni, 1999; 
Boari, 2001). 
 
A second observation relates to the degree of variation among regional firms. 
Originally, firms in the Alpha region suffered from stagnation and inertia, but because 
of their different sets of skills and capabilities, the collective strength (SAA) turned 
out to represent a catalyst for development. This finding supports earlier studies that 
have shown that heterogeneity among firms (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Menzel & 
Fornahl, 2010) and the development of old traditions (Anderson, 2000; Best & Xie, 
2006) play an important role in firms’ ability to adapt to changing environments.  
 
A third finding supports earlier studies that have suggested that external networks 
can mitigate disadvantages related to a lack of proximity to industry clusters (Jarillo, 
1989; Gulati, 1998). Several informants stated that the semidominant firm spent vast 
resources on entering national arenas to overcome the barrier of its peripheral 
localization. Because of these activities, a critical relationship was established with 
MCB (Table 6). 
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Table 6. Quotes illustrating the conditions for firm development and cluster 
formation 
 Alpha Beta 
Conditions for firm 
development and cluster 
formation 
“If you look at similar projects in 
similar small regions, we actually 
have an advantage. We already 
have an established industry that 
represents a promising starting 
point” (SAA representative) 
“One of the major things we have 
done is to go through with the 
ISO9001 qualification. It illustrates 
a kind of commitment, or 
seriousness if you like. In addition, 
we invested in new state of the art 
headquarters. These, and other 
things, I believe has been noticed in 
the national arena. It illustrates 
that we are ambitious and 
proactive” (semidominant firm 
representative) 
 “If now things actually start to roll, 
I’m sure that this will set off an 
immense development. Activity 
fosters activity” (Sector expert) 
“We want other firms to establish 
within the region because we believe 
that a wider set of actors will, as a 
collective, have increased chances of 
gaining ground in the national and 
international market for oil and gas 
services” (SAA representative) 
“Many of our existing suppliers are 
dissatisfied with our emphasis of 
establishing up there (the Alpha 
region). They see it as an 
unnecessary cost because they are 
able to serve us from their current 
location down south. We still 
communicate it’s an advantage to 
be located closest to the project 
activities” (a representative) 
“I believe the way forward is to 
concentrate Northern Norwegian 
oil and gas activities in two or three 
onshore locations, no more than 
that. It’s simply not enough 
offshore activity (drilling, 
exploration, etc.) or existing 
industry to warrant oil and gas 
hubs in every other municipality” 
(sector expert) 
 
 
Discussion 
This paper poses two research questions: (1) In what way can large oil and gas 
companies facilitate the formation of regional networks and strategic alliances? (2) 
How can large-scale oil and gas projects and strategic alliances foster regional cluster 
formation? Studies have shown that networking is more prevalent among firms with 
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high spatial proximity (Huggins & Johnston, 2010). Similarly, our findings suggest that 
in peripheral regions, spatial proximity can be considered a key determinant of the 
formation of regional strategic alliances. 
 
In project Alpha, the role of oil company α was a prominent feature in facilitating a 
successful alliance formation. The catalyst for its success rested on the moderating 
effect of merging a regional alliance with a large national contractor. In project Beta, 
oil company β had no direct moderating role in the process of fostering SAB, nor did 
β affect the relationship between SAB and MCB. Accordingly, because of its direct 
interaction with MCB, the semidominant firm in SAB was the only regional firm that 
gained access to external knowledge and learning. Although scholars have claimed 
that firms independently identify the need for an alliance and the partners available 
(Gulati, 1998), our findings show that dominant actors may facilitate the best possible 
approach to alliance formation. Our findings suggest that the alliance formation 
process takes a rather different approach in peripheral regions because of limited 
access to alliance partners and a lack of alliance capabilities. 
 
In addition, our findings illustrate that for small firms, establishing alliances with large 
firms facilitates the highest value in terms of accessing resources, knowledge and new 
markets. Despite varying results in both this study and previous studies (Vandaie & 
Zaheer, 2013), our findings are consistent with much of the literature on strategic 
alliances between small and large firms (Alvarez & Barney, 2001; Yang et al., 2013). 
In project Beta, a structural hole (Burt, 1995) was observed between the initial firm 
network and MCB. This structural hole created a knowledge gap between the two 
actors owing to the lack of formal ties, whereas the semidominant firm gained early 
access to higher-quality information. Additionally, the semidominant firm was placed 
in a situation in which it had the ability to take part in two separate interactions 
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(Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). This structural hole and the subsequent knowledge 
gap ultimately led to SAB’s failure. The findings thus support earlier studies that have 
demonstrated that cooperative arrangements facilitate the transmission of 
knowledge and information (Koka & Prescott, 2002; Casanueva et al., 2013).  
 
With regard to research question two, in project Alpha, oil company α had an active 
role. The role of dominant firms is considered one of the prerequisites for cluster 
development (Rugman & Verbeke, 2003; Doutriaux 2008). The bases of what 
developed into an emerging cluster structure were, therefore, several nondominating 
regional firms and one that held a dominant leadership role. These bases can be 
characterized as an asymmetrical cluster (Rugman & Verbeke, 2003), in which a 
dominant firm intentionally facilitates development by first linking regional firms (as 
in this case) and later linking those firms with a main, national contractor.  
 
The level of firm heterogeneity played a role in facilitating the emerging cluster 
structure in project Alpha. As discussed in the theoretical section of the paper, firms’ 
different characteristics influence the motivation to geographically cluster (Shaver & 
Flyer, 2000). In this paper, our empirical findings illustrate that because of the lack of 
other alternatives, the small peripheral firms had no objections to clustering. MCA 
and MCB, on the other hand, were willing to put efforts into establishing strategic 
partnerships with firms located in peripheral regions (Lazerson & Lorenzoni, 1999).  
 
Although earlier studies have focused mainly on external knowledge channels in 
welldeveloped clusters (Henn, 2013), our study brings a novel contribution premised 
by the context of a peripheral and emerging cluster. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, in the event of a large-scale 
project entering a small peripheral region, the dominant actor needs to function as 
an active and inclusive moderator to facilitate firm development and potentially 
emerging cluster structures. The role of the dominant actor as a moderator is 
important because of dominant actors’ ability to share knowledge and their authority 
in connecting large firms to small regional firms. Second, if regional firms are to 
successfully establish forms of alliances or networks, their cooperation must be based 
on formalized agreements.  
 
The theoretical implications of this study can first be associated with networking in 
entrepreneurial firms. Our findings suggest that firms aiming to develop by entering 
new markets are affected by the mode of networks that they are able to establish. 
Informal, weak-tie networks may lack the necessary structure to properly release the 
potential benefits of collective efforts. In addition, our findings support the literature 
on structural holes. By linking the dimension of peripheral localization to the concept 
of networks, theoretical progress can be made.  
 
Moreover, our study clearly illustrates that dominant firms in large-scale projects play 
a crucial role in the emergence of potential cluster structures. In peripheral regions, 
the presence of such actors can facilitate external linkages that contribute to 
knowledge and learning, thus mitigating the disadvantages of small firm size, 
remoteness and a lack of legitimacy for peripherally located firms. This is a novel, but 
context-dependent, theoretical contribution to the existing literature on cluster 
emergence.  
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The practical implications of our study are the following. First, entrepreneurs in 
similar contexts may learn from our findings related to the structure of the networks 
established, and that dominant actors that enter a region can be beneficial in the 
sense that they can mitigate the disadvantages of firms’ peripheral localization. 
 
Second, policy-makers can draw upon our results by examining how policies can affect 
the approach of dominant actors entering small regions. Policy-makers should 
emphasize that parts of project organizations should be localized at project sites. 
Measures should be aimed at project managers at the earliest project phases. In this 
way, project managers would have the possibility to adapt and implement measures 
aimed at project stakeholders. 
 
Finally, we illustrate that the highest value for small peripheral firms trying to enter 
new markets results from interactions either with large firms central to large-scale 
projects or direct interactions with project operators. 
 
Limitations and Further Research 
The study has several limitations related to its methodological approach. The data 
used to investigate the cases were based on accounts provided by key individuals. 
Although most of these individuals represented their respective firms, some 
responded on behalf of a larger group of firms (e.g. the manager of the firm network 
in SAB).  
 
Moreover, our results show that the collective gain differs between SAA and SAB. One 
possible explanation of this result is the differing composition of the firms in the two 
alliances. The traditionally oriented characteristics of the firms in SAA may have 
facilitated entry into the new business area. Further, both SAA and SAB (except for 
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the semidominant firm) firms were viewed as homogeneous groups. If a distinction 
had been made among the firms, we may have arrived at different results.  
 
These issues can be explained mainly by the selection criteria set by the regional 
populations, however. When studying phenomena in peripheral regions, the amount 
of accessible cases can be very limited, as was the case in this study. Previous studies 
have illustrated that the performance and composition of clusters and regions vary; 
thus, owing to the idiosyncratic features of case regions, our findings cannot be 
directly transferred to different contexts.  
 
For further research, one interesting issue would be to study in greater detail the 
relationship between small firms and large firms in strategic alliances. Another 
interesting issue would be to look more closely into cases in which clusters have 
emerged despite the absence of critical actors, such as a research community and 
institutions for collaboration (Tödtling & Trippl, 2005).  
 
Despite its limitations, we hope that this study offers valuable and novel insights 
about how firms in two regions have experienced change and development resulting 
from the entry of large-scale oil and gas projects. 
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